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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning almost two decades ago, I wrote a series of law review 
articles about the nature of legal proof in the context of probabilistic 
evidence or analysis.1  In these articles, I explored, in passing, some of 
the differences between the legal system’s concept of proof of facts, 
especially in the context of civil litigation, and the same subject as 
seen by scientists, especially those analyzing empirical data. 
I put that endeavor aside for what turned out to be an extended 
period while my career took a different turn, focusing on the 
intricacies of commercial law.  In the last decade, much of my time 
has been devoted to the problems of international commercial 
transactions.  In particular, a major portion of my work during this 
time has involved the negotiation of various principles to govern 
international transactions.  In one case, I was the chair of a task force 
within the drafting committee preparing Revised Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code which developed Article 9’s rules 
governing international secured transactions from the perspective of 
domestic United States law.  In another case, I spent several years as a 
member of the United States delegation to the working group of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) which developed an international convention (now 
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 1 See Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of 
Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985) [hereinafter Confidence in 
Probability]; Neil B. Cohen, The Costs of Acceptability: Blue Buses, Agent Orange, and 
Aversion to Statistical Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 563 (1986) [hereinafter Costs of 
Acceptability]; Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A 
Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78 (1987) [hereinafter Conceptualizing 
Proof]. 
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known as the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade).  More recently, I have been a 
delegate to UNCITRAL’s effort to develop an international legislative 
guide for secured transactions. 
I mention these international activities not to recite my resume 
but, rather, because they relate in unexpected (to me, at least) ways 
to the topic at hand in this symposium.  In many of the international 
negotiations in which I have been engaged, the most difficult paths to 
resolution were not those that involved doctrines with respect to 
which legal systems obviously differed.  In those cases, representatives 
of the relevant states were prepared for the advocacy and give-and-
take that are part of the resolution of the differences in an 
international forum.  Rather, the greatest challenges to resolving 
differences arose where legal systems used the same or similar words 
to describe legal doctrines based on very different concepts.  In these 
areas, the delegates from the affected states had significant difficulty 
understanding the fact that delegates from other states could be 
using the same words to describe very different concepts.  The result, 
in many cases, was that there was often a greater appearance of 
agreement than there was agreement itself.  Moreover, when 
delegates finally discovered their disagreements, solutions were more 
difficult to reach because the initial reactions to discovery of the 
nature of the disagreement tended to be on the order of “[t]hey 
don’t know what they’re talking about—that word just doesn’t mean 
what they’re using it to mean!” 
As a result, similarities in nomenclature first obscured 
differences in substantive norms and then made these differences 
more difficult to resolve.  The result of such apparent agreement, 
and more difficult resolution of disagreement, created by 
inconsistent nomenclature can easily lead situations in which those 
versed in different systems talk at each other, each convinced of the 
inherent virtue of the concepts of his or her system, rather than learn 
from each other. 
At this point, a reader might ask how these difficulties in 
international substantive law negotiations relate to the role of experts 
in civil litigation.  The answer, I believe, is that the relationship is 
quite strong.  When experts from other disciplines testify in a legal 
proceeding, particularly when the proceeding is a fact-finding 
exercise in civil litigation governed by standard burdens of 
persuasion, rather than a criminal trial with its higher burden on the 
prosecution, there is significant risk that the use, by law and the other 
disciplines, of similar vocabulary to abbreviate materially different 
concepts will result in mirages that can easily lead to inappropriate 
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evidentiary and substantive decisions. 
In this article, I focus on civil litigation, rather than on the 
criminal process, because the legal system is much more open about 
the meaning of the fact-finding process in civil litigation.  While no 
two people seem to agree on the meaning of the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard of proof in a criminal case,2 this is not the 
case for civil litigation.  In the civil context, the range of views as to 
the meaning of the burden of persuasion is much narrower.  In 
particular, it seems well-accepted that the standard burden of 
persuasion in civil cases—the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard—can be expressed probabilistically: the plaintiff (or other 
party bearing the burden of persuasion) must demonstrate that the 
probability of the facts supporting its case exceeds 0.5.3  This ability to 
express the burden of persuasion probabilistically has several 
implications.  For one thing, it promises (but does not always deliver) 
a conceptual link between legal proof standards and the standards of 
scientific and technical disciplines that rely on probabilistic 
reasoning.  Second, and perhaps more important, it masks the 
important differences in the value systems that govern standards of 
legal proof and parallel standards of scientific and technical inquiry.  
In particular, the standard of proof in civil litigation, and the value 
system that lies beneath it, weigh the cost of errors so differently than 
most scientific disciplines that the fact that a “mainstream” scientist 
would not testify as to a particular conclusion does not necessarily 
mean that the same conclusion is valueless or “junk science” for the 
purposes of law. 
I write this essay because I am quite concerned that the use of 
rules generated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals4 and its 
progeny to determine whether to admit scientific and technical 
expert testimony will fall prey, and perhaps already has fallen prey, to 
the “similar-words-but-differing-meaning” phenomenon that I have 
described above.  Federal Rule of Evidence 702,5 with its emphasis on 
scientific knowledge, and Daubert, with its emphasis on acceptance in 
 
 2 See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 409-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(Weinstein, J.) (surveying judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York), aff’d on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1979). 
 3 Of course, this is an oversimplification in many respects.  Moreover, the 
consensus I describe is subject to some important conceptual differences from a 
simple probabilistic formulation.  See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On 
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985); see also 
Confidence in Probability, supra note 1. 
 4 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 5 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
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the scientific community, create a great risk that evidence that is 
relevant to the demonstration of facts at issue in a civil proceeding 
will be excluded or substantively minimized by misunderstandings 
about how data (i.e., evidence) is utilized to develop statements of 
“knowledge” in scientific communities consistent with the norms of 
those communities—norms that differ fundamentally from the norms 
of civil litigation.6  Because plaintiffs typically bear the burden of 
persuasion in civil litigation, plaintiffs will likely bear the costs of this 
misunderstanding.  Even if one does not shed a tear for plaintiffs as a 
general matter, however, I suggest that one should nonetheless be 
concerned about the fact that such misunderstandings can increase 
the amount and cost of errors in the civil litigation system. 
Before continuing, I should point out at this juncture that my 
lengthy sojourn from immersion in the fields of probability and 
proof, combined with the fact that I am not, and do not purport to 
be, an expert in the law of evidence generally, leads me to paint with 
a somewhat broad brush.  I am also likely to fall prey to the same 
phenomenon that I described in the context of international 
litigation; namely, that my use of various terms in this article may not 
always be precisely consistent with their meaning as terms of art in 
the world of evidence or in the world of probability and statistics.  
Moreover, I have striven to use as little technical vocabulary as 
possible in this essay, so as not to obscure my areas of concern.  
Indeed, the legal system’s attempts to piggy-back on the language 
used in scientific reasoning, rather than on the underlying reasoning 
itself, may be part of the problem about which I am concerned. 
Part I of this essay compares and contrasts the process by which 
courts in civil litigation and scientists, particularly those in highly 
empirical disciplines such as epidemiology (a frequent source of 
scientific expertise in civil litigation), utilize the knowledge of 
discrete and incomplete data about the possible existence of an 
ultimate fact to form a conclusion as to whether that fact exists.  Part 
II of this essay identifies concerns emanating from the actual and 
potential misunderstanding of these differences by courts.  Finally, 
Part III of this essay sketches out the contours of a theory explaining 
why the Daubert model of gatekeeping might be appropriate to filter 
out “junk,” but inappropriate when used to filter out legitimate 
analysis that is sensitive to the needs of civil litigation. 
 
 6 See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are 
Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 
335 (1999). 
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I.  FACT-FINDING IN LAW AND SCIENCE 
While some aspects of science are highly theoretical and 
deductive, many other aspects are inductive.  In this context, I use 
“inductive” not so much as a description of the reasoning process as a 
description of the knowledge development process.  Although the 
process of generating theories or models from higher (or earlier 
established) principles already known or believed to be true is 
deductive, the process of testing these theories—examining the 
factual evidence to see if the theories work as promised—is inductive.  
Most scientific endeavors contain this inductive, or fact-inferential, 
aspect.  Some disciplines, such as epidemiology, are largely 
dominated by it. 
Similarly, while much of legal reasoning is deductive (minor 
rules that follow from the existence of a major rule are typically 
determined by deductive reasoning), much of the legal system follows 
an inductive path.  The legal realists certainly realized this.  
Moreover, some of the most renowned examples of modern 
lawmaking, such as Llewellyn’s UCC, overtly used inductive reasoning 
to find governing legal principles from the realities of business 
practice, rather than the other way around.  Yet, the inductive nature 
of much of the legal system is not limited to rule-creation.  In 
particular, the process of finding facts at trial is inductive.   
Not only do law and science share this inductive approach to 
reaching factual conclusions, they both use words like “prove” (or 
similar words such as “demonstrate”) to describe what they do.  Yet, 
while people often speak of legal “proof” or scientific “proof” as 
though they are akin to mathematical or logical proof, this is 
certainly not the case.  Mathematical proofs are either valid or flawed 
depending on the logical rigor by which one moves from the initial 
premise to the conclusion.  Legal proof and scientific proof are quite 
different from mathematical proof; so much so that it is in many ways 
remarkable that they share the same key word—“proof”—with 
mathematical proof.  Legal and scientific proof would perhaps more 
accurately be described as “fact finding” or, even better, “fact 
inferring.”  These disciplines do not traverse a logical route from 
premise to conclusion but, rather, traverse a route from individual 
data points of information—fact evidence—to inferences about 
ultimate facts at issue.  Both law and science are willing to draw such 
inferences, and both have standards to determine when such 
inferences may be drawn.  The standards in the legal world are more 
formal, even if often stated casually or incompletely.  Conversely, 
although the standards governing inference from data in scientific 
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disciplines are more a product of custom and informal consensus 
than of formal normative mechanisms, they are typically expressed 
more formally than the norms of the legal system. 
Thus, in neither empirical science nor in litigation are facts 
“proven” in any rigorous sense of the word.  Rather, facts relevant to 
the proposition sought to be proved or disproved (sometimes called 
the probandum) are considered and, if those facts lead the decision 
maker to conclude that the probability that the probandum is accurate 
is sufficiently high, the matter is pronounced proven (or 
demonstrated).7  This is an important point.  In epidemiology, for 
example, the scientist typically does not profess knowledge of the 
underlying biological mechanism causing a particular medical 
problem.  Instead, the epidemiologist utilizes various probabilistic 
techniques to examine the degree of association between the 
suspected “cause” and the undesired “effect.”  Similarly, in litigation, 
unless the facts sought to be “proven” consist of an event that takes 
place in front of jury, the facts are not really proven in the sense of 
either actual knowledge or logical proof.  Instead, other facts, such as 
the testimony of fact witnesses, are brought to the attention of the 
factfinder, and the factfinder must decide whether these other facts 
lead the factfinder to assess the probability of the probandum as being 
sufficiently high.  Even in the case of eyewitness testimony, the 
process is ultimately probabilistic—the factfinder must assess the 
likelihood that the witness’s perceptions were accurate and that he or 
she is testifying truthfully about those perceptions.8  In other words, 
while those who report the results of epidemiological or legal fact-
finding typically speak of “proof,” neither of those disciplines really 
engage in proof in the more formal sense of the term.  Rather, they 
engage in something very different—the drawing of inferences from 
incomplete information.  This observation is not a criticism of either 
law or science; rather, it is simply a description of what they do.  It is 
this “proof” process, however, in which the role of experts is debated. 
II.  MISUNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAW AND SCIENCE 
Given the similarities between legal fact-finding and scientific 
fact-finding, it may appear that both disciplines are engaging in the 
same endeavor.  Thus, scientists arguably should be able to speak 
easily to a legal audience about facts that have been found or 
demonstrated in science, with the concept of such demonstration 
neither gaining nor losing meaning.  In my opinion, though, the 
 
 7 See, e.g., Confidence in Probability, supra note 1. 
 8 See, e.g., Costs of Acceptability, supra note 1, at 566. 
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apparent synonymity between legal proof and scientific proof is 
chimerical.  Although the two types of “proof” share both 
superficially similar vocabulary and the basic goal of drawing 
inference from incomplete data, they approach these endeavors in 
fundamentally different ways. 
Associate Justice Harry Blackmun seemed to realize this ten 
years ago in Daubert, when he wrote: 
[T]here are important differences between the quest for truth in 
the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory.  
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.  Law, on 
the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.  The 
scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging 
consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are 
incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an 
advance.  Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, 
however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding 
legal judgment—often of great consequence—about a particular 
set of events in the past.  We recognize that, in practice, a 
gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably 
on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic 
insights and innovations.9 
In my view, Justice Blackmun got this exactly right, and then 
proceeded to get it exactly wrong.  I believe that Justice Blackmun 
was correct as to the existence of “important differences between the 
quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the 
laboratory.”10  More importantly, though, I think that his statement in 
Daubert turned the implications of those important differences on 
their heads.  Justice Blackmun seemed to think that science 
sometimes relies on a fact-finding thought process that is 
insufficiently rigorous and inappropriate for the legal system and, 
thus, should be filtered out.  I would argue that the opposite is true.  
Science, particularly empirical science that relies on statistical or 
other probabilistic methods, routinely uses filters that prevent its 
experts from reaching exactly the sort of opinions as to the truth of 
ultimate facts that should be utilized in a civil trial governed by the 
preponderance of the evidence rule. 
In particular, there are three main differences between the 
process of formulating scientific conclusions and the process of 
formulating factual conclusions.  First, the two systems have very 
different explicit and implicit value judgments concerning the 
 
 9 509 U.S. at 596-97. 
 10 Id. 
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relative costs of errors.  Standards of factual inference used in the 
world of science tend to assume that the costs associated with 
inaccurately determining that a proposition is proven or 
demonstrated—the costs of inaccurately discarding what many call 
the “null hypothesis”—are much greater than the costs of 
inaccurately declining to conclude that the proposition has been 
proven or demonstrated even though the proposition is true.11  One 
of the premises of civil litigation, on the other hand, is that the 
societal cost of errors favoring the plaintiff is the same as the societal 
cost of errors favoring the defendant.12  To put it another way, the 
preponderance of the evidence standard suggests that the civil 
litigation system ascribes essentially equal costs to inaccurately 
proclaiming a proposition to be demonstrated and to inaccurately 
declining to proclaim that the proposition has been demonstrated. 
Second, science is comfortable with a fact inference process that 
creates a broad category of “suggested but not proven” facts.  That is, 
scientific analysis of empirical data frequently leads to indeterminate 
conclusions that, if fully expressed, could be summarized as: 
The information collected in this study is consistent with the 
proposition that A is correlated with B (and, indeed, does not 
support the proposition that A is not correlated with B) but, 
because the amount of information is relatively small, we cannot 
comfortably rule out the possibility that our observations are a 
product of chance rather than true correlation, and, therefore, 
we will not conclude at this time that the correlation exists.  We 
must emphasize, though, that this does not mean that we 
conclude that the correlation does not exist. 
Historically, the civil legal system has not utilized this sort of non-
finding.  In a trial, the facts are either proven or not—either the 
plaintiff wins or the defendant wins.  While Scotland distinguishes 
between verdicts of “innocent” and “not proven” in criminal trials,13 
there is no analog in American civil litigation.  While the concept of 
equipoise exists in civil litigation, it is usually conceptualized as a 
narrow, knife-edged tie—a finding of a 50-50 balance in the 
probability assessment by the factfinder.14  Thus, in a sense, scientific 
 
 11 See Confidence in Probability, supra note 1, at 412-18. 
 12 See generally Confidence in Probability, supra note 1. 
 13 See www.scotland.gov.uk/faq/notprov.asp (last visited May 18, 2003). 
 14 I have written elsewhere that we should recognize that concepts of legal proof 
incorporate the idea of “confidence intervals” which would, in their operation, create 
a small category of “not proven,” even in civil litigation.  See supra note 1.  I note, 
however, that the costs of pro-plaintiff errors and pro-defendant errors in civil 
litigation should be equal and, thus, the legal “confidence intervals” would be 
narrower than those typically used in science.  As a result, application of my theories 
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factfinders have available three possible answers to the question of 
whether A is associated with B: (i) no, (ii) yes, and (iii) “the evidence 
suggests yes, but we are not yet ready to proclaim that the answer is 
yes because the evidence could be an artifact of chance.”  On the 
other hand, legal factfinders in the context of civil litigation have 
only two answers truly available: yes and no.  The legal system, faced 
with the scientific trichotomy, typically, yet mistakenly, translates the 
third scientific answer into a simple “no.” 
Third, the process of finding facts in the context of civil 
litigation is a “one-shot deal.”  Either the plaintiff has proven her 
facts, or she has not, but she has only one chance to make her case—
now and forever.  This is assuredly not the approach of the world of 
science.  In that world, a conclusion of “suggested but not proven” 
simply means that there is more work to be done (and often is used 
as the argument for funding that work).  In other words, the scientific 
verdict of “not proven” can be translated to “stay tuned.”  Law, 
however, does not stay tuned.  After one trial, it tunes out. 
In many ways, the points I have summarized above with respect 
to science have their strongest resonance in scientific disciplines such 
as epidemiology, in which the inferential reasoning is most overtly 
statistical and as to which the admissibility of expert testimony 
appears to be most frequently challenged.  If the question at hand is 
whether A causes B (or, to avoid the various conundra associated with 
causation, whether A is associated with B), an epidemiologist does 
not examine the physical mechanism by which A and B might be 
connected (such as, for example, the cell biology of why exposure to 
benzene may be associated with increases in certain cancers).  Rather, 
an epidemiologist examines raw data (whether collected by the 
epidemiologist or others) and performs statistical analysis.  Typically, 
the epidemiologist will utilize both descriptive and inferential 
statistics with the output being a descriptive statement about the 
observed relationship between A and B in the data set being 
examined and an inferential statement that considers the possibility 
that the described facts could have occurred simply by chance in the 
absence of the relationship suggested by the observation.  Most 
commonly, the epidemiologist will decline to characterize the data as 
showing a particular relationship between A and B unless the 
probability that the relationship could have occurred by chance even 
in the absence of the observed relationship is quite low.  The most 
 
would result in a somewhat broader concept of equipoise than the classical view, but 
it would still leave that category much narrower than the scientific “suggested but not 
demonstrated” category. 
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common threshold for such a probability is 5%.  Sometimes, an 
epidemiologist or similar researcher will provide the descriptive 
statistics along with an analysis stating at what significance level (i.e., 
the probability that the results would occur by chance in the absence 
of the observed relationship) the descriptive statistics are 
“significant.”  In such cases, the epidemiologist, or the user of his or 
her studies, will typically not place weight on observed results that are 
not significant at the 5%, or 0.05, level.15 
Let us go through this a bit more carefully and specifically.  
Epidemiologists and similar scientific analysts of empirical data often 
describe their hypothesis testing process as determining whether they 
have disproved a “null hypothesis” of the absence of the point sought 
to be proved.16  In the case of a possible toxic substance, for example, 
the null hypothesis is that the substance is not toxic.  After examining 
the evidence, an epidemiologist may pronounce the null hypothesis 
as disproven, or not.  If it is disproven, the null hypothesis of no 
relationship is rejected.  If it is not pronounced disproven, whether 
because the evidence supports the null hypothesis or because the 
evidence does not support it but the possibility that the evidence was 
created by chance rather than by the falsity of the null hypothesis is 
too high, null hypothesis is not rejected. 
In other words, data can fail to “disprove” the null hypothesis for 
two very different reasons: (i) the evidence is consistent with null 
hypothesis, (ii)  the evidence is inconsistent with the null hypothesis 
but, given the amount and nature of the data and of the null and 
alternative hypotheses, the epidemiologist or similar scientist cannot 
sufficiently rule out the possibility that the apparent inconsistency 
results solely from the luck of the draw. 
Take a simple example—a public opinion poll.  If 100 people 
are interviewed and 98 say that they will vote for the Democratic 
presidential candidate, that would certainly be sufficient to disprove 
the null hypothesis of a Republican victory.17  Similarly, if 98 of the 
interviewees indicate that they will vote for the Republican, that 
would clearly be consistent with the hypothesis of Republican victory.  
If, however, 52 of the 100 state that they will vote for the Democrat 
 
 15 See generally T. WONNACOTT & R. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR 
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS § 19-1, at 539-43 (2d ed. 1977). 
 16 See H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 113-14 (2d ed. 1972). 
 17 In this oversimplified example, I am, of course, painting with an even broader 
brush than normal.  Obviously, a laundry list of assumptions—such as, for example, 
that the interviewees truly represent a random sample and that they will vote for the 
same candidate whom they indicated to the pollster they would support—should 
qualify this statement. 
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and 48 state that they will vote for the Republican, the pollster does 
not state that a Democratic victory is imminent; rather, the pollster 
will state that the race is “too close to call.”  Thus, in both the second 
and third situations, the pollster will not reject the  null hypothesis of 
a Republican victory.  Yet, if one asked the pollster in the second and 
third cases what election result she would predict if she had to make a 
prediction based solely on the polling data, it seems obvious that 
those predictions would differ. 
These two decisions to decline to reject the null hypothesis are 
very different.  In the first case, the facts are consistent with the null 
hypothesis.  If anything, the evidence makes us believe in the null 
hypothesis even more.  In the second case, though, the facts are not 
what one would expect if the null hypothesis were true.  Indeed, the 
facts should make one have some additional doubts about the null 
hypothesis.  An epidemiologist declines to rule out the null 
hypothesis in the second case not because the facts support the null 
hypothesis—they do not—but because the inconsistent facts are of 
questionable robustness.  The probability that they could occur just 
by coincidence if the null hypothesis is true is too high for comfort. 
The first type of declining to reject the null hypothesis is akin to 
a verdict of innocent—the factfinder is confident of the truth of the 
null hypothesis.  The second situation, though, is more akin to the 
Scottish verdict of not proven.  That verdict does not involve a 
statement as to the ultimate truth or falsity of the probandum or the 
null hypothesis.  It is, as Charles Nesson might say, a statement about 
the evidence, rather than the event.18  It is a statement that the 
evidence, in light of formal and informal burdens of persuasion, is 
insufficient to establish a particular hypothesis, even though the facts 
suggest the truth of that hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, in either case, epidemiology pronounces that the 
null hypothesis has not been disproven.  It is important to note that 
this is not very different from adjudication in our criminal justice 
system, in which the conclusions of “not proven” and “innocent” are 
combined in the single verdict of “not guilty.”  There is one key 
difference, of course.  A legal verdict of not guilty ends the matter 
once and for all.19  A scientific verdict of not proven is merely one 
step in a continuing effort to ascertain how the world works. 
Again, the epidemiological verdict declining to rule out the null 
hypothesis does not mean that the null hypothesis is, indeed, true, or 
that the epidemiologist believes it to be true.  It may be false, and the 
 
 18 See Nesson, supra note 3. 
 19 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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epidemiologist may have a personal belief that it is (probably) false.  
The “not proven” statement means only that the epidemiologist 
declines to proclaim it false because, within the scientific system in which 
the epidemiologist operates, the cost of a wrongful proclamation that null 
hypothesis is disproven is higher than the cost of inaccurate silence as 
to the disproof of the null hypothesis when that hypothesis is, indeed, 
disproven. 
Thus, there are situations in which, if a wealth maximizing 
epidemiologist were forced to place a wager at even odds as to 
whether the null hypothesis is true or false, without the option of 
declining to bet, she would place her bet on the proposition that the 
hypothesis is false, even though, in the system in which she operates, 
the conventional balancing of costs of errors leads to a statement that 
the invalidity of the null hypothesis is “not proven.” 
To put this another way, epidemiologists and similar scientists 
are given three choices to describe the results of their inquiries: (i) 
the evidence is consistent with the null hypothesis; (ii) the evidence is 
inconsistent such that we are sufficiently confident the evidence did 
not result from chance; and (iii) evidence is inconsistent with the 
null hypothesis but too close to the line for the investigator to go out 
on a limb with an unnecessary proclamation. 
If the scientific conclusion about the evidence is such that an 
assessment of the truth proposition under consideration is “too close 
to call,” science doesn’t stop.  Rather, one more item is added to the 
pile of things about which we have not reached a firm conclusion, but 
to which we may return at some future date. 
Let us now return to fact-finding in the context of civil litigation.  
In civil litigation, the vocabulary is similar, but the analysis is quite 
different.  As in science, the rules of civil litigation do not demand 
that plaintiff “prove” its case in any real sense.  Logical proof is not 
required.  Neither is proof by the exclusion of all other possibilities, 
nor by the demonstration that the probability of the probandum 
equals or closely approaches 1.0.  Rather, all that is required is that 
the plaintiff demonstrate that the probandum of his or her case is 
more likely than not to be true.  In other words, all that is required is 
a probability greater than or equal to 0.5. 
This preponderance of the evidence standard means that the 
legal system is willing to tolerate errors in either direction in the 
adjudication of civil cases.  This is different from criminal 
prosecution, where the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard 
explicitly indicates the existence of a strong negative societal value for 
false convictions by indicating that society does not want to convict 
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the defendant unless the factfinders are virtually sure of the 
defendant’s guilt and, concomitantly, society’s willingness to acquit 
those who are “probably” guilty but not indubitably so.  Thus, the 
implicit “error economics” of criminal prosecution are such that the 
cost of a false conviction is much higher than the cost of an 
inaccurate acquittal.20 
The error weighting of civil litigation is very different from this 
criminal justice proof model.  By providing that the plaintiff wins if 
the probability of the probandum is even slightly greater than 0.5, and 
that the plaintiff loses even if that probability is slightly less than 0.5, 
the legal system has implicitly told us that the cost of a factually 
inaccurate verdict for the plaintiff is essentially the same as the cost of 
a factually inaccurate verdict for the defendant.  After all, the system 
is telling us both that the plaintiff should prevail if the probability of 
the facts at issue is 0.51 (and, thus, there is a forty-nine percent 
chance that the verdict is factually inaccurate and that the cost of this 
error will be borne by the defendant) and the defendant should 
prevail even if the probability of the plaintiff’s facts is 0.49 (and, thus, 
there is a forty-nine percent chance that the verdict is factually 
inaccurate and that the cost of this error will be borne by the 
plaintiff). 
The civil litigation proof model is also very different from the 
implicit rules in scientific decision making described above.  As 
noted, the process of scientific inquiry often results in evidence that 
does not support the null hypothesis, but which does not differ from 
that hypothesis to an extent that survives significance testing at the 
selected threshold—usually the 0.05 standard.  In the world of 
science, this failure of the evidence countering the null hypothesis to 
survive significance testing does not disqualify the subject-matter 
from further inquiry, resulting in a permanent scientific decision in 
favor of the null hypothesis.  Rather, it is an invitation of sorts for 
further research (and grant applications) to gather sufficient data to 
determine whether this will yield an inference against the null 
hypothesis that is significant. 
In civil litigation, on the other hand, the verdicts and 
consequences, associated with the factfinders’ conclusion that either 
 
 20 See Utah v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 1957) (“It is better that ten guilty go 
free, than that one innocent be punished.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970) (“We do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as the 
equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.”); D. Michael 
Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”—
Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 442-45 
(1998); Alexander Volokh, Aside: Guilty Men, 146 U. PENN L. REV. 173 (1997). 
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the null hypothesis (absence of facts resulting in liability) is 
supported by the evidence or that matters are “too close to call”—i.e., 
in equipoise—are identical: the plaintiff loses and cannot relitigate 
the case.  There is no opportunity to put off a final verdict until more 
data can, perhaps, be gathered in the future and no opportunity to 
relitigate if and when such data are available. 
In light of the finality (against the plaintiff) associated with a 
conclusion that matters are too close to call, it is not surprising, then, 
that the “too close to call” region—i.e., equipoise—is traditionally 
conceptualized as razor thin in models of proof subject to the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  Most models hypothesize a 
very simple proof mechanism, in which the probability of the facts at 
issue is ascertained (whether with rigor or by seat-of-the-pants 
calculus), and if the probability of the probandum is less than 0.5 or 
exactly equal to 0.5 the plaintiff loses.  If the plaintiff demonstrates a 
probability even a hair’s breadth greater than 0.5, however, the 
plaintiff prevails.21 
To put this another way, by analogy to statistical terms, the civil 
litigation system tends to act as though the only relevant piece of 
probabilistic information that need be considered in determining 
whether the evidence supports a verdict for the plaintiff is the “point 
estimate” of the probability of the plaintiff’s facts.  The concept of a 
“confidence interval” surrounding the point estimate, the choice of a 
significance level utilized to construct that interval, the size of the 
resulting interval, and whether that interval straddles the 0.5 
threshold, are not considered in the current model. 
As noted previously, several years ago I suggested a more 
nuanced model of civil proof, utilizing the statistical concept of 
confidence intervals to explain a somewhat broader area of equipoise 
in which the plaintiff does not prevail.  I suggested that 
this new model clarifies the practical content within the concept 
of equipoise. Situations in equipoise—in which neither party can 
meet the burden of persuasion—would include not only 
situations where the true probability is exactly 0.5 but also all 
situations in which the interval estimate of the probability of the 
facts supporting liability straddles 0.5.  In any such case, the 
evidence provided by the parties would be insufficient to allow the 
factfinder to state with sufficient confidence that the probability 
that the facts support either party’s position exceeds 0.5.  
 
 21 See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 
1065 (1968); Lozowick et al., Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 
66 MICH. L. REV. 1641 (1968); Zeisel, Statistics as Legal Evidence, 15 INT’L 
ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 246 (D. Sills ed. 1968). 
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Accordingly, in these cases it is important to determine which 
party will suffer for that mutual inability.  Under the reformulated 
definition of the quantum of the burden of persuasion, allocation 
of the burden determines who will lose when the factfinder 
cannot determine with the requisite amount of confidence on 
which side of 0.5 the true probability lies.22 
Even in my model, though, the nether region of indeterminacy 
would be narrower than the corresponding region in the sciences.  I 
argue strongly that the significance level that determines the size of 
confidence interval for legal proof should be determined by the 
values of civil litigation, in which pro-plaintiff errors and pro-
defendant errors are assumed to carry equal societal costs, not the 
values of epidemiology and similar sciences, where inaccurate 
proclamations of fact are more disfavored than silence when the facts 
are true.23 
The upshot of all this is that, whether one follows the traditional 
model of civil proof or my alternative model, the process and 
structure of making legal fact-finding decisions from available 
evidence is quite different from the process and structure of making 
fact-finding decisions from available evidence in much of the 
scientific world.  As noted earlier, not only do the two systems place 
different relative values on the different types of fact-finding errors, 
but they differ as to the number of opportunities for the proponent 
of an idea to make his or her case, and the consequences of 
indeterminate evidence.  The legal system gives each plaintiff only 
one chance to prove his or her case, with a limited role for the 
concept of equipoise.  Epidemiological and other scientific fact-
finding, on the other hand, do not limit the opportunity to reach a 
conclusion to a single investigation, and build into the decision 
process a serious role for equipoise.  Even apart from the other 
differences, this broad concept of equipoise, in which the null 
hypothesis is deemed not to have been disproven, casts a pro-null 
hypothesis bias into the assessment of whether any particular set of 
data leads to the conclusion that the probability of the null 
hypothesis is less than 0.5.  Translating this bias to civil litigation 
would transform it into a pro-defendant bias. 
It may be easier to see the difference between the two systems by 
describing them in terms of wagers.  Models of scientific proof could 
 
 22 See Confidence in Probability, supra note 1, at 419. 
 23 Compare Conceptualizing Proof, supra note 1, with David H. Kaye, Apples and 
Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54 
(1987). 
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be described as a wager in which the scientist/gambler has three 
choices: he or she may bet on the truth of the null hypothesis, bet on 
the falsity of the null hypothesis, or decline to place a bet at this time 
because the facts currently available render the matter too close to 
call with a high degree of confidence.  Moreover, if the 
scientist/gambler opts for the too close to call option, he or she may 
place a bet at a later time if additional facts are developed that lead 
the scientist/gambler to a different conclusion.  Legal proof 
governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard, on the 
other hand, as noted earlier, allows the legal factfinder to choose 
from only two possible wagers—the factfinder must bet, at even odds, 
either for or against the plaintiff’s facts.  Quite obviously, as 
factfinders forced to wager our own money, many of us would decline 
to bet if the evidence in a particular case left matters so close that it 
was difficult to separate meaningful inferences from the role of 
chance,24 but the choice of betting is not allowed legal factfinders.  
Moreover, a legal factfinder cannot return and cast a different bet if 
additional evidence is developed in the future. 
I have explored these differences in legal decision making and 
scientific decision making—differences that are profound despite the 
similarities of language used to describe them—because I fear that 
these differences are not recognized by courts that must make 
decisions about scientific evidence, particularly evidence that the 
scientific world examines through a probabilistic lens. 
Indeed, some post-Daubert cases suggest that the deference to 
the methods of the world of scientific decision making is already 
beginning to have the undesirable effect of confusing scientific and 
legal values, and the norms that follow from them.  An example is 
provided by a decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in one of the 
Bendectin cases, declining to give credence to epidemiological 
testimony utilizing a significance standard less rigorous than the 
traditional 0.05 standard.  According to that court: 
We think it unwise to depart from the methodology that is at 
present generally accepted among epidemiologists.  See generally 
Bert Black, The Supreme Court’s View of Science: Has Daubert 
Exorcised the Certainty Demon?, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2129, 2135 
(1994) (stating that “‘[a]lmost all thoughtful scientists would 
agree . . . that [a significance level of five percent] is a reasonable 
general standard’” (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor 
Alvan R. Feinstein in Support of Respondent at 16, Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 
 
 24 See Conceptualizing Proof, supra note 1. 
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2d 469 (1993) (No. 92-102))). Accordingly, we should not widen 
the boundaries at which courts will acknowledge a statistically 
significant association beyond the 95% level to 90% or lower 
values.25 
The Havner decision was rendered in the context of sufficiency 
of evidence rather than admissibility of evidence.  Nonetheless, the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Texas does not appear to be 
limited to that context.  Indeed, the journey from a conclusion that 
use of a significance level other than 0.05 renders epidemiological 
inference insufficient on which to base fact-finding to a conclusion 
that the use of such a significance also renders it inadmissible is 
minuscule.26 
Moreover, it should be noted that the Havner court’s analysis was 
not reached casually and without serious thought.  The Havner 
opinion quotes the assertion of one of the plaintiff’s experts that a 
significance level of 0.10 should be used27 and the explanation of 
another expert that “[you] don’t ever see [confidence intervals of 
50% or 60%] in a scientific study because that means we’re going to 
miss it a lot of times and [scientists] are not willing to take that risk.”28  
In addition, the court noted that a pre-Daubert federal district court 
had concluded “that the scientific standard for determining 
causation is much stricter than the standard employed by the court 
and that confidence levels of 95%, 90%, or even 80% should not be 
required.”29 
Thus, the Havner court was well-aware that legal decision making 
need not follow norms of scientific decision making, yet it decided 
nonetheless to yoke the two together.  Accordingly, the spectre of 
barring the testimony of scientific experts because their threshold 
standard for willingness to conclude that a particular set of facts 
clearly exists.  This is a part of a general failure of the legal system to 
understand the implications of the methods of scientific decision 
making and their effect on legal decision making. 
Thus, I believe that there is reason to be seriously concerned 
that unthinking conformity to scientific decision making standards 
suggested by Daubert will have a serious substantive impact on civil 
litigation—especially litigation about facts that are incompletely 
 
 25 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 724 (Texas 
1997). 
 26 See also Finley, supra note 6. 
 27 953 S.W.2d at 717-18. 
 28 953 S.W.2d at 724. 
 29 Id. (quoting Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117, 1119-
20 (D. Idaho 1990)). 
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understood.  Of course, admitting the testimony of scientific experts 
whose conclusions would not be reached by applying scientific 
standards of decision making under uncertainty will result in some 
errors.  That goes without saying—in fact-finding under conditions of 
uncertainty, of course mistakes will be made.  But civil litigation does 
not presume the same obsession with avoiding the error of premature 
conclusion as does science, which can always re-examine matters 
again in the future.  The tragedy of equating legal fact-finding 
governed by the preponderance standard with scientific fact-finding 
is that the cost of the errors caused by this obsession—costs that are 
borne primarily by plaintiffs—will be discounted or ignored entirely.  
The result would be a sub silentio imposition of the values inherent in 
scientific decision making on the very different world of civil 
litigation. 
Let us return to Justice Blackmun in Daubert.  Justice Blackmun 
recognized these differences, but suggested that the implication is 
that law should filter out what science considers.  As I see it, it is just 
the opposite—law should allow in conclusions that science filters out. 
III.  BLACK BOXES AND CLEAR BOXES 
I think that the problem about which I am concerned may be 
caused in part by an implicit assumption by Daubert as to the nature of 
scientific and similar expert testimony.  Daubert seems to assume a 
“black box” model of scientific and other expert testimony in which 
data is given to the expert (or developed by the expert himself or 
herself), the expert puts the data into a “black box” in which his or 
her analysis takes place out of sight of the factfinders, and out pops a 
conclusion.  An example of that model might be provided by a 
proffered handwriting expert, who is given samples of the 
defendant’s handwriting and the document in question, analyzes 
them, and pronounces the document to have been written (or not to 
have been written) by the defendant.  While the expert might recite 
the factors that lead him or her to the conclusion, the process by 
which those factors are weighed and balanced, as well as the 
justification for using those factors and not others, takes place in the 
expert’s mind. 
Close examination of the Daubert criteria—testing to see if the 
expert’s theory can be falsified, whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication, the known or 
potential rate of error of the scientific technique in question, and 
general acceptance within the scientific community—reveals that 
they are attuned to determining whether such a black box should be 
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trusted. 
In addition, the Daubert criteria, and the gatekeeping function 
that they animate, is based on an assumption that judges will be 
better than jurors at identifying and excluding untrustworthy black 
boxes, and the experts who propose to use them.  This paternalistic 
view of the court, as Joseph Sanders calls it,30 would seem to depend 
for its validity on the accuracy of that assumption.  Are judges indeed 
better than jurors in choosing when to disregard the “scientific” 
claims of charlatans and hired guns?  If the answer to this question is 
no, the gatekeeper function would seem to rest on dubious 
assumptions.  Moreover, if judges filter out more invalid black boxes, 
but at the cost of also filtering out more valid black boxes that are 
inaccurately seen as insufficient for admissibility under the Daubert 
criteria, one cannot say that the paternalistic role is justified without 
examining the cost of the factually mistaken verdicts that result from 
inaccurate exclusion of testimony.  One cannot count only the 
positive value of the tuna captured in a efficient net; one must also 
count the cost of the innocent dolphins inadvertently destroyed by 
the same net. 
Yet, as discussed in this essay, the sort of expertise that appears 
often in civil litigation is not “black box” expertise such as the 
testimony of handwriting experts.  Rather, the testimony of 
epidemiologists and scientists using similar methods to extract 
empirical judgments from individualistic data, is based on expertise 
that takes place in a “clear box” in which the entire thought process 
of the expert can be monitored and assessed. 
Imagine an epidemiologist who offers to testify as follows 
(transformed into an imaginary version both wordier than one would 
expect to see in actual testimony and somewhat oversimplified for 
ease of discussion) in a lawsuit claiming that a drug manufacturer 
should be liable for health problems related to high blood pressure 
allegedly caused by allergy medication sold by that manufacturer: 
In a study of two groups of 100 otherwise similar women, one 
group taking the particular allergy medication and the other 
group taking no allergy medication, two of the women in the 
unmedicated group developed high blood pressure, while six of 
the women in the medicated group developed high blood 
pressure.  This difference (2% versus 6%) suggests that more than 
half of the cases of high blood pressure in the medicated group 
resulted from the medication.  Of course, though, this observed 
 
 30  Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003). 
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difference may not reflect a real difference resulting from the 
medication; even if the two groups are composed of otherwise 
equivalent women, it is possible that the medication has no effect 
on high blood pressure rates and the observed difference is 
simply a result of random fluctuations.  As an epidemiologist, I 
am familiar with probability theory.  Applying standard 
probabilistic models of binomial distributions, I can tell you that, 
if the medication had absolutely no affect on high blood pressure 
rates, we could expect to see the observed data (that are 
suggestive of such a relationship) approximately X% of the time.  
I would not proclaim in an academic paper the existence of a link 
between the medication and high blood pressure because X% is 
greater than 5% (a common epidemiological standard for making 
such a proclamation); rather, I would write that the link is 
suggested by the data but does meet stringent scientific standards 
designed to minimize accidental proclamation of inaccurate 
findings—even at the cost of failing to proclaim accurate 
findings—and, therefore, additional studies should be done to 
determine if this suggested connection actually exists.  But you 
have not asked me to present an academic paper; you have asked 
me to help you conclude, in a setting in which you have only one 
chance to get it right, and in which mistakes in either direction 
are deemed to be equally costly, whether there is such a link.  In 
light of those two factors, which are not present in my academic 
milieu, I would not use the 5% significance level to filter out 
suggestions that emerge from the data.  In this setting, I would set 
the threshold somewhat lower, which I believe more accurately 
reflects the balance of considerations in this setting.  The 
observed link between the medication and high blood pressure 
would occur less than Y% of the time if there were no actual link.  
Thus, the key question is whether significance at the Y% level is 
sufficient to consider the observed relationship.  In light of the 
purposes of civil litigation as I understand them, Y% would 
appear to be sufficient but, of course, I understand that this 
choice does not belong solely to me.  Thus, while I would 
conclude, for the purposes of this factfinding endeavor, that the 
medication appears to be linked to high blood pressure, I urge 
you to decide the relative risks and costs of errors that flow from 
inaccurately finding a link and from inaccurately finding that 
there is no link, and determine a significance level appropriate 
for that task and compare that significance level to Y% in order to 
decide whether to accept my testimony as evidence of a link. 
There is no “black box” in this testimony.  All of the proffered 
testimony is transparent—the box is clear.31  The expertise consists of 
 
 31 Actually, I suppose some of the calculations, such as the binomial probabilities 
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a recital of data points already found or assumed, followed by a 
summary of what the data show and a step-by-step explication of what 
probability theory tells us about the likelihood that a different state of 
affairs.  It concludes with an overt statement of the expert’s opinion, 
accompanied by directions on how to utilize the data based on the 
factfinder’s choice of significance level. 
Examining the Daubert criteria in the context of scientific 
expertise of this sort reveals their utter inapplicability to it.  The 
expert is proffering no theory that is subject to falsification.  The 
techniques of inferential statistics have obviously been subject to peer 
review, but this is not necessarily the case with respect to the expert’s 
exposition concerning the use of significance levels.  The scientific 
technique of evaluating the evidence has no error rate—it is, itself, 
merely a statement about error rates!  Finally, the testimony discloses 
on its face that the method the expert suggests for resolving the fact-
finding endeavor in a legal setting is not generally accepted for use in 
the scientific community.  I suggest that the Daubert criteria provide 
little or no guidance for this sort of testimony.  I would further 
suggest that in the litigation described above, the proffered evidence 
should be admitted. 
One might respond that this case is too easy.  Of course it is.  I 
constructed it to make a point.  If, however, we make the case a bit 
more realistic by deleting much of the explanation from the expert’s 
testimony, we would be left with the same core of fact-finding (“I 
would conclude, for the purposes of this fact-finding endeavor, that 
the medication appears to be linked to high blood pressure . . . .”), 
reached by a scientifically nonstandard method of reasoning that is 
hard to justify under the Daubert tests.  Daubert gatekeeping creates 
too great a risk that this sort of testimony—accurate as to facts, 
helpful as to probabilistic analysis, and with implicit value judgments 
in the choice of significance levels so easily illuminated by cross-
examination that there is no need to protect the factfinders by 
exclusion of the testimony—will nonetheless be excluded. 
A believer in the paternalistic model might still justify the 
gatekeeper role with the assertion that judges can better evaluate 
analyses of this sort than can juries, but I doubt that a strong case has 
been made for the truth of this assertion.  Comparative studies of the 
likelihood of judges and juries falling for common statistical fallacies 
tell only part of the story.  We must also consider the possibility of 
 
referred to in the proffered testimony, emerge from a black box. These too, however, 
could be explained, albeit at greater length, so that all of the expert’s reasoning 
would be transparent. 
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unwarranted hostility to statistical and probabilistic proof on the part 
of the judiciary.  After all, the judge as gatekeeper in civil litigation is 
justifiable only if the cost of errors from wrongful judicial filtering-out 
of “good” testimony is less than cost of errors from the jury 
wrongfully believing “junk.”  Since, in civil litigation, the societal cost 
of the two errors is presumed to be equal, this means that role of 
judges as filters enhances accuracy in fact-finding only if there will be 
fewer errors from wrongful judicial filtering than from wrongful jury 
gullibility. 
A casual perusal of court decisions should rob anyone of the 
delusion that black robes provide immunity from that sort of error.  
More common are whoppers like that of Justice Powell, casually 
dismissing statistical evidence of racial disparities in death penalty 
sentencing in McCleskey v. Kemp:”  
Even a sophisticated multiple-regression analysis such as the 
Baldus study can only demonstrate a risk that the factor of race 
entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily 
lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing 
decision.”32 
Somehow, Justice Powell did not choose to point out that even 
the fact that an eyewitness testifies that she saw a particular event 
occur also only demonstrates that there is a risk (i.e., a probability) 
that the event has occurred.  The factfinder must take into account 
(explicitly or implicitly) such factors as whether the witness had a 
motive to lie, the possibility that the witness, whether or not she had a 
motive to lie did, in fact, make statements at variance with her 
memory of the event, whether the witness sincerely misremembers 
events, and whether the witness’s eyesight or hearing led the witness 
to believe she saw or heard something that did not happen, all 
leading ultimately to a probabilistic judgment as to whether the event 
occurred.  In other words, eyewitness testimony “can only 
demonstrate a risk that” the allegedly witnessed event occurred.  
Somehow, though, it seems unlikely that Justice Powell would have so 
glibly dismissed a case based on eyewitness testimony on the ground 
that the testimony established only a risk.  Rather, it appears that he 
simply was reluctant to utilize overtly probabilistic testimony to make 
an important decision.  Perhaps important societal values, not 
identified by Justice Powell, justify this reluctance33.  Minimizing the 
cost of errors (or at least optimizing them)—the touchstone of the 
preponderance standard in civil litigation—does not appear to justify 
 
 32 481 U.S 279, 292 n.7 (1987). 
 33 See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 3. 
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it, though. 
Accordingly, it is not clear to me that we are better off with 
judges as gatekeepers of “clear box” scientific testimony in civil cases.  
The Daubert criteria do not apply well, and the virtue of the judiciary 
as a filter of otherwise-relevant evidence in order to enhance the 
accuracy of verdicts is far from clear. 
